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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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Education

Ph.D. in Economics, New York University, 2021–present

Thesis Title: *Trust the Process or Trust the Worker? Sorting with Heterogeneity in Firm Production Styles*

BA in Economics, Columbia Univeristy, 2017-2021

References

Professor Guido Menzio
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Professor Corina Boar
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Professor Katarina Borovickova
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
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Professor Niklas Engbom
Stern School of Business, NYU
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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary field: Macroeconomics, Labor
Secondary fields: Economics of Expectations

Teaching Experience

2023	Macroeconomics II (G), New York University
2024	Statistics (UG), New York University

Research Experience and Other Employment

2022	New York University, Research Assistant for Katarina Borovickova and Jaroslav Borovicka
2023 – 2024	New York University, Research Assistant for Niklas Engbom

Conferences and Seminars

2026	NYU Macroeconomics Student Workshop, NYU Stern Macroeconomics Workshop, Barcelona Summer Forum Macroeconomics of Labor Markets, Society for Economic Dynamics (Athens), FRB Philadelphia
2025	NYU Macroeconomics Student Workshop
2024	NYU Macroeconomics Student Workshop, NYU Microeconomics Student Workshop

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2021–present	MacCracken Fellowship, New York University
2017	Sanford S. Parker Prize, Columbia University

Research Papers

Trust the Process or Trust the Worker? Sorting with Heterogeneity in Firm Production Styles (Job Market Paper)

Firms differ in their production styles. Some cultivate strong processes, so output depends mainly on the process itself; others avoid strict rules and rely on their workers' skill. I develop and calibrate a structural model of the labor market with two-sided heterogeneity. Firms are heterogeneous along two dimensions, one which is supermodular with worker quality (sensitivity) and one which is additive with worker quality (productivity). The model matches a novel fact on worker wages and flows: establishments paying similar wages differ greatly in the rates at which they hire workers from employment versus from unemployment. The calibrated model reveals substantial heterogeneity along both firm dimensions and strong sorting between worker quality and firm sensitivity, but only weak sorting along productivity. I use the model to study the effects of technological change that standardizes work. Holding aggregate output fixed, a 30% decline in firms' sensitivity to worker quality raises the employment rate by 10 p.p., raises the wages of low-quality workers by up to 7% and lowers the wages of the highest-quality workers by 6.5%.

Statistical Discrimination in Frictional Labor Markets: Theory and Application to Immigration Enforcement (with Myunghwan Andrew Lee and Jaeyeon Shin) R&R at AEJ: Macroeconomics

We develop a dynamic search-and-matching model where firms can tilt their vacancy postings toward groups of workers whose observable traits are correlated with productivity relevant unobserved types. Applied to U.S. low-skilled labor markets, the model shows that firms disproportionately post vacancies toward Hispanic workers, who are more likely to be undocumented and to have a lower outside option. Motivated by E-Verify mandates, we study the effects of immigration enforcement requiring firms to verify worker eligibility. Enforcement leads firms to redirect search away from Hispanics and reduce overall job creation, which worsens labor market conditions for both undocumented and native workers.

Firm-Worker Matches: Experience or Inspection Goods? (w/ Victoria Gregory and Guido Menzio)

We propose a novel empirical strategy to infer the extent to which firm-worker matches are inspection or experience goods. We argue that the informative content of the signals that firms and workers receive

about the productivity of their match before entering an employment relationship can be inferred from the gaps between the separation rates of workers hired from unemployment, employment at low-tenure jobs, and employment at high-tenure jobs. We implement the strategy using German administrative data. We find that, before entering an employment relationship, a firm and a worker receive a signal that reduces the variance of their beliefs about the productivity of the match by 67%. The informative content of the signal varies according to the gender and the education of the worker, and it has increased over time. If matches were pure inspection goods, labor productivity would be 1.5% higher, and output 2% higher. If matches were pure experience goods, labor productivity would be 2% lower, and output 4% lower.

The Role of Parental Beliefs and Public Policies in Financing Higher Education: An Experimental Study (w/ Francesco Agostinelli and Guglielmo Briscese)

This study examines the impact of beliefs and the policy environment on parental decisions about saving for their child's college education, a crucial tool for human capital investment. Through a survey experiment, we elicit parental beliefs about the future costs of college and their expectations of different funding sources, including financial aid and student loans. Our findings indicate that while nearly all parents intend to support their child's pursuit of higher education through financial transfers, many fall short in their savings due to underestimating future expenses and overestimating available financial aid. A corrective information intervention encourages parents to recalibrate their saving target and increases their willingness to seek additional sources of income to meet this goal. However, a substantial gap between expected and actual costs in conjunction with a high hypothetical student loan interest rate leads to a discouragement effect that diminishes both their willingness to save and their aspirations for their child's educational attainment. Parents with higher financial literacy are less susceptible to misperceptions, show greater responsiveness to corrections, and experience weaker discouragement from adverse policy environments. We discuss policy implications for outreach activities to support informed financial planning for college education.

Works in Progress

Improving job seekers' beliefs and employment outcomes: an experimental study (w/ Guglielmo Briscese and Giulio Zanella)

Skills and Competences

Languages	English (Native), Italian (native)
Citizenship	United States, Italy, Switzerland
Programming	Matlab, Python, R, Stata, Julia